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Macarena Ares, Reto Bürgisser and Silja Häusermann
Department of Political Science, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 crisis presents a unique opportunity to study how public opinion
towards the redistributive role of the state reacts to a major economic shock.
The pandemic and the measures taken to stop it exposed citizens to both
increased fiscal constraint and heightened redistributive capacity: historical
drops in GDP (and fiscal revenue) coincided with unprecedented increases in
public spending on healthcare provisions and social policy, as well as
staggering amounts of financial liquidity provided to hard-hit economic
sectors. How did this affect citizens’ attitudes towards redistribution and their
assessments of the capacity of the state to intervene? To tackle these
questions, we rely on a two-wave panel survey fielded in Germany, Sweden
and Spain in late 2018 and June 2020. While preferred levels of redistribution
have remained largely stable, our results indicate major shifts and growing
ideological polarization around perceptions of welfare state efficiency and
capacity, fiscal constraint and political trust. Hence, the COVID-crisis has so far
neither led to a left- nor a right-wing shift in citizens’ desired level of state
intervention, but to an increasingly polarized context of (re)distributive
politics, which is likely to imply heightened conflict over economic and social
policy in the future.
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Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused a major health crisis across the globe,
and the measures taken to cope with it introduced major restrictions to econ-
omic activity, provoking a historical economic contraction and consequently
lower tax revenues. At the same time, governments have taken unprece-
dented public spending measures to mitigate the consequences of the pan-
demic. Not only did governments ramp up healthcare provisions in no time,
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but they also provided staggering amounts of financial liquidity to hard-hit
economic sectors and wage supplements to smoothen consumption and
avoid mass unemployment (OECD 2020).
Despite these efforts, the COVID-crisis has intensified actual and perceived
social risks, particularly those related to employment and health (Breznau
2021). This presents a unique opportunity to study how public opinion
towards the state’s redistributive role reacts to a major crisis. Understanding
how economic changes affect citizens’ policy attitudes and political behavior
has become a major concern of political science (Hacker, Rehm, and Schle-
singer 2013). While much research has focused on the economic and ideo-
logical roots of policy preferences, we still know relatively little about how
malleable they are over time. Only recently, research moved towards studying
how dynamic economic experiences alter policy attitudes and political
behavior (Margalit 2019). In this article, we explore the extent to which the
crisis has changed citizens’ attitudes towards the state’s redistributive role
on two key aspects: how much the state should intervene to redistribute econ-
omic resources (i.e. the level of intervention); how much it can intervene, and
how well it operates in doing so (i.e. the capacity to intervene).
Theoretically, we can imagine four different ways public opinion reacts to
such shocks: shift, stability, polarization, or convergence. Our expectations
going into this analysis are quite open, given the idiosyncratic nature of
the pandemic-induced economic shock. First, attitudes can uniformly shift
in one direction. Studies on macroeconomic conditions and public opinion
indicate that an economic contraction tends to shift citizens to the left of
the political spectrum and to increase support for social spending (Bleke-
saune 2007; Margalit 2013; Naumann, Buss, and Bähr 2016), though in
some instances, it can also shift aggregate policy preferences to the right
(Durr 1993; Stevenson 2001). Moreover, the experience of economic shocks
can also spill over to non-economic attitudes, such as political trust (Algan
et al. 2017). While other major economic shocks, like the Eurozone crisis,
were associated with an overall decline in trust (Foster and Frieden 2017;
Muro and Vidal 2017), initial evidence suggests that the shock induced by
the COVID-crisis has increased political trust (Bækgaard et al. 2020; Bol
et al. 2021; Esaiasson et al. 2020), potentially pointing to the conditioning
effect of a swift and robust state response (Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011).
Second, attitudes may also remain stable. If attitudes are deeply rooted in
beliefs, they are likely to be sticky. Even in the case of major economic
shocks, such as the Great Recession, massive attitude changes have been rela-
tively rare, and on average, a majority of people is likely to stick with their
prior views (Margalit 2019).
Focusing on average shifts or stability, however, can mask significant atti-
tudinal heterogeneity in response to the COVID-19 shock. Hence, attitudes can
– third – polarizewhen we witness “a movement away from the center toward
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the extremes” (Fiorina and Abrams 2008, 567). There is ample evidence of
economic shocks having polarizing effects on attitudes with the core con-
ditioning factor being prior ideology (Brunner, Ross, and Washington 2011;
Majlesi, Dorn, and Hanson 2020). In response to a shock, citizens try to
make sense of a crisis and the world they live in and update their attitudes
as a function of their prior leanings (Taber and Lodge 2006). Thus, we
might expect that the crisis produces heterogeneous effects due to direction-
ally motivated reasoning (Flynn, Nyhan, and Reifler 2017). Finally, the oppo-
site of polarization is possible as well, and attitudes may converge. A shared
experience of a crisis can also create a “rally around the flag” effect (Hether-
ington and Nelson 2003) and lead to a process of attitudinal convergence.
Initial evidence from Canada, Norway, and the Netherlands proposes that citi-
zens indeed tend to rally around the flag and converge on higher levels of
political trust (Bækgaard et al. 2020; Merkley et al. 2020; Schraff 2020).
To study the impact of the pandemic-induced economic shock on atti-
tudes towards the state’s redistributive role, we rely on a two-wave panel
survey fielded in three countries – Germany, Sweden, and Spain – in late
2018 and June 2020. We selected the three cases to achieve maximum var-
iance along the relevant dimensions of crisis affectedness and government
responses. Such a diverse case method is well suited to potentially capture
the full variation of changes to public opinion (Seawright and Gerring
2008). Despite these differences, our results are remarkably similar across
countries. We find no evidence of a generalized shift – neither to the right
nor to the left – in citizens’ demand for economic redistribution and
welfare provision by the state. However, we do observe more significant
shifts in how public opinion perceives the context and capacity for state inter-
vention. Most importantly, we find substantive ideological differentiation in
how citizens have adapted these perceptions about the room of maneuver
and capacity for state intervention in the economy.
Methods
To address how citizens’ attitudes towards the level and capacity for (re)dis-
tributive state intervention have changed after the onset of the COVID-
crisis, we rely on a two-wave online panel survey (for further details see Häu-
sermann et al. 2020). This allows us to track changes in participants’ attitudes
towards the (re)distributive role of the state. The first wave of the survey cap-
tured citizens’ preferences on redistributive policies across several West Euro-
pean democracies. The second wave of the panel was specifically designed to
assess how the COVID-crisis and the ensuing governmental measures could
affect these attitudes, focusing on three countries: Germany, Spain, and
Sweden. The fieldwork for the first wave of the panel took place from 4 to
23 October 2018 in Germany (n = 1,722), and from 21 November to 8
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December 2018 in Spain (n = 1,503) and Sweden (n = 1,500). The second wave
was fielded in these three countries from 4 to 20 June 2020, and only targeted
recontacts from the first survey. The successfully recontacted sample is larger
in Germany (n = 892) than in Sweden (n = 653) and Spain (n = 643).1
The two waves include items that allow us to capture citizens’ preferences
over 1) levels of redistribution by the government, and 2) how they perceive
the context and capacity for this intervention. In this first dimension of level of
intervention we rely on items capturing:
(i) agreement with whether income differences should be small for a
society to be fair (1-4 Likert scale);
(ii) agreement with whether social benefits and services (in the respective
country) place too great a strain on the economy (1-4 Likert scale);
(iii) preferences for expansion or retrenchment of welfare benefits and ser-
vices (ranging 0–28 with higher values indicating support of expansion
and opposition to retrenchment);2
(iv) ideological left-right self-placement (0-10 scale).
To get at the second aspect of state capacity, we rely on:
(i) citizens’ perceptions of the prevalence of tradeoffs in welfare policy,
measured by agreement whether increases in welfare benefits for
some people will come at the cost of lower benefits for others (1-4
Likert scale);
(ii) perceptions of fiscal constraint, captured by agreement whether taxes
are already high and the government should not levy money from citi-
zens via taxes anymore (1-4 Likert scale);
(iii) evaluations of state effectiveness, captured by whether political decisions
are generally implemented effectively in the respective country (1-10
scale);
(iv) evaluations of welfare state efficiency, measured by whether the money
that goes into the welfare state is wasted or used efficiently (1-10 scale);
and
(v) political trust, measured by trust in politicians (1-10 scale).3
The sample comprises individuals for which we have observations on all
relevant variables in the two waves. To assess change in preferences across
1This difference in the recontact rate is due to the survey company – Bilendi – working with its own
proprietary panel in Germany, but with partners in Spain and Sweden, for which not all original par-
ticipants could be recontacted.
2This measure aggregates preferences concerning expansion and retrenchment on five welfare policy
fields: pensions, childcare, education, unemployment benefits, and active labor market policies.
3Table S.1 in Supplementary Information presents the question wording.
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time our outcome variables are preferences in wave 2 of the panel, which we
model on individual-level characteristics of the respondent, country fixed-
effects, and an indicator variable for the second wave. The coefficient for
the wave-2 variable is our key estimate of interest since it captures how pre-
ferences in wave 2 differ (on average) from preferences in wave 1. It is a
measure of average attitudinal shifts. All variables are normalized to a 0–1
scale to facilitate comparison across attitudes. Estimations are based on
OLS models including controls for respondents’ age, gender, social class
(Oesch’s 5-class scheme), whether the respondent has children, and ideologi-
cal self-placement in wave 1 (except for models with ideology in wave 2 as
the outcome variable, which do not include the lagged measure as an expla-
natory factor). The second set of estimations, which address heterogeneity in
attitudinal change by ideology, are specified as interactive models. We
include lagged ideology (from wave 1) as a moderator, interacting it with
the indicator variable for wave 2. This interaction term captures how attitudi-
nal change between waves depends on citizens’ ideology. We rely on lagged
ideology to avoid endogeneity problems arising from respondents adapting
their ideological placement to the crisis.
We probe the robustness of our findings on the ideological heterogeneity
of attitudinal responses by estimating additional models accounting for two
alternative explanations to ideology, i.e. individual perceptions of economic
risk and election winner-loser status (lagged measure of support for the
party in government versus opposition). We present the results pooled and
by country separately. In a last step, we zoom in on Germany, where we differ-
entiate how attitudes have changed among the main parties’ supporters. In
Germany we find left- and right-wing parties both in government and oppo-
sition. This allows us to better disentangle ideological from winner-loser
differences.
Results
Average attitudinal stability and shifts
First we address potential shifts in citizens’ attitudes towards the (re)distribu-
tive role of the state due to the COVID-19 crisis and the massive government
efforts to cope with it. Figure 1 displays average differences in respondents’
attitudes between the first and the second waves, when controlling for age,
gender, social class, being a parent, ideology in wave 1 and country-fixed
effects. There is no evident shift in public opinion about the desired level of
state intervention in the economy. Despite the massive economic shock, indi-
viduals’ preferences concerning income redistribution, the economic strain
generated by social services, the expansion of welfare benefits and services,
and left-right ideological placement remain virtually constant. None of the
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coefficients capturing average shifts between waves reaches conventional
levels of statistical significance.
Not all attitudes appear immune to the COVID-crisis. While preferences
about levels of state intervention show impressive stability, we find substan-
tive shifts on items capturing the capacity for redistributive intervention in
terms of the constraints faced, and the ability and trust in government inter-
vention. Compared to 2018, respondents are now, on average, more likely to
understand welfare policies in terms of tradeoffs, i.e. they perceive that
increasing benefits for specific groups will necessarily entail retrenchment
in other areas. Attitudinal shifts are also large in what concerns perceptions
of state effectiveness in implementing its decisions, and in political trust.
Changes on these two items amount to one point on the original 10-point
scale, which is substantive. Hence, even if respondents appear to perceive
higher constraints on redistributive policies, they are also more trustful of
politicians and more likely to perceive the state as effective when intervening.
Additional models estimated separately by country (displayed in Figure S.1 in
Supplementary Information) indicate that these results are not driven by one
particular country. Stability in preferences about levels of redistributive inter-
vention is constant across all countries (except preferences concerning
income redistribution which shifted slightly to the right in Spain). Concerning
Figure 1. Average predicted attitudinal differences between waves (with 95% confi-
dence intervals).
Note: Estimates based on additive OLS regression models introducing controls for lagged ideology, age,
gender, social class, parent status, and country-FE. Full models are presented in table S.2 in the Sup-
plementary Information.
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attitudes about the context and capacity for state intervention, the results are
robust throughout these country- specific estimations.
Ideological heterogeneity: increasing polarization in assessments of
the capacity for redistributive intervention by the state
Some of the stability in public opinion, however, could be masking substan-
tive heterogeneity in how citizens have responded to the COVID-19 crisis. We
focus, mainly, on ideological differences – on whether individuals of different
ideological leaning differ in how they update their preferences about the
state’s role in the economy, and the room of maneuver and capacity for
the state to intervene. Below we center the discussion and presentation of
results selectively on those items on which we find evidence of ideological
heterogeneity – pointing to an increase in polarization. However, it is
equally important to address those issues on which stability in average pre-
ferences over time is accompanied by stability in how they are distributed
within the electorate: we do not find evidence of any ideological polarization
regarding income redistribution, social services posing a strain on the
economy, or welfare state expansion. In other words, the non-significant
results reported in Figure 1 do not mask subgroup heterogeneity in left-
and right-shifts when it comes to the preferred level of state intervention,
but indeed reflect stability. In itself, this stability is an important finding
given the massive economic challenge posed by the COVID-crisis, and its
implications for social welfare needs.
We do not observe ideological polarization either when it comes to per-
ceptions of tradeoffs in welfare policies. The increasing understanding that
welfare expansion will come – sooner or later – at the cost of retrenchment
is a generalized shift in public opinion, common to both right- and left-
wing ideological camps. This is an important complement to the evidence
on polarization we will discuss subsequently, as it underlines that the
shared perception of increased constraints heightens this polarization.
However, we do indeed find evidence for ideological polarization when it
comes to the key items capturing perceptions of the room of maneuver for
state intervention, and of the state’s capacity to intervene. Hence, even
though Figure 1 showed no evidence for significant average shifts in percep-
tions of the state’s fiscal constraints, we do find ideological differences in how
these perceptions have evolved.4 As displayed in Figure 2, there is a signifi-
cant, though rather weak increase in ideological polarization in fiscal con-
straint perceptions. While right-wing respondents have become more likely
to perceive a sharper limit on the state’s ability to levy taxes, left-wing respon-
dents now see more room for increased taxation. The separate country
4The coefficient for the interactive term in the pooled model is statistically significant for p<0.05.
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analyses indicate that these results are mainly driven by the Spanish case,
whereas in Sweden, polarization is driven unilaterally by left-wing voters
seeing more room for taxation.
Ideological differentiation in how public opinion has reacted to the COVID-
crisis is strongest in respondents’ perceptions of state intervention capacity
and political trust. As depicted by the blue dashed line in Figure 3, pre-
crisis in 2018, there were hardly any differences in how citizens of different
ideological leaning evaluated the state’s effectiveness in implementing its
decisions. In the pooled model, in Germany, and in Spain, the slope is
almost flat, while Sweden depicts a negative slope where right-wing respon-
dents rated state effectiveness worse. By mid-2020, we observe a stronger
association between ideology and evaluations of state capacity. In all three
countries, polarization has increased, with perceptions of effectiveness
having improved among left-wing respondents.
This increasing ideological differentiation is also manifest (to a smaller
extent) in the more specific evaluations of welfare state’s efficiency (as
depicted in Figure 4). Already in late 2018, perceptions of welfare state
efficiency were associated with ideology, i.e. left-wing respondents displaying
more positive evaluations of welfare-state efficiency. This ideological differ-
ence has become more marked by 2020. The change is most remarkable in
Figure 2. Average predicted perceptions of fiscal constraint by lagged left-right ideol-
ogy and wave (with 95% confidence intervals).
Note: Estimates are based on interactive OLS regression models introducing controls for age, gender,
social class, parent status, and country-FE (in the pooled sample). Full models are presented in table
S.6 in the Supplementary Information.
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Figure 3. Average predicted perceptions of state effectiveness by lagged left-right
ideology and wave (with 95% confidence intervals).
Note: Estimates are based on interactive OLS regression models introducing controls for age, gender,
social class, parent status, and country-FE (in the pooled sample). Full models are presented in table
S.7 in the Supplementary Information.
Figure 4. Average predicted perceptions of welfare state efficiency by lagged left-right
ideology and wave (with 95% confidence intervals).
Note: Estimates are based on interactive OLS regression models introducing controls for age, gender,
social class, parent status, and country-FE (in the pooled sample). The full models are presented in
table S.8 in the Supplementary Information.
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Spain, where such ideological differenceswere practically nonexistent in 2018.
By mid-2020, respondents on the extreme left and right differ by over two
points on the original 10-point scale. Ideological polarization on this item
has become somewhat stronger in Germany as well, where left-wing respon-
dents have significantly improved their evaluations of welfare state efficiency.
Lastly, Figure 5 displays ideological polarization regarding political trust. As
was the case with state effectiveness, there has been a strong shift towards
increasing ideological differentiation in levels of trust in politicians. This
trend is replicated across the three different cases under consideration. Ideo-
logical differences in levels of political trust were relatively marginal in late
2018. Only Sweden displayed a more marked negative association, whereby
right-wing respondents were more distrustful of politicians. In mid-2020,
there is a clear negative association in all countries considered. In the
pooled model, average differences in political trust between extreme right-
and left-wing respondents are more than three times larger in wave 2 than
they were in wave 1 of the panel. This trend towards increasing polarization
is particularly visible in Spain and Germany. Moreover, in all three cases,
shifts in attitudes between waves are larger among left-wing respondents.
This overview of the results summarized in Figures 2–5 highlights the
importance of having addressed ideological heterogeneity in attitudinal
Figure 5. Average predicted political trust by lagged left-right ideology and wave (with
95% confidence intervals).
Note: Estimates are based on interactive OLS regression models introducing controls for age, gender,
social class, parent status, and country-FE (in the pooled sample). Full models are presented in Table
S.9 in the Supplementary Information.
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responses to the COVID-crisis. While the average shifts presented in Figure 1
mostly painted a picture of stability, some aggregate trends were indeed con-
cealing substantive ideological polarization. Moreover, even if there are no
signs of change or polarization on preferences concerning levels of economic
redistribution by the state, it is important to point out that ideological differ-
ences on this dimension were already present in late 2018. Respondents on
the left continue to display higher support for income redistribution and
welfare state expansion, and to perceive social services as less of a strain
on the economy than those on the right. After the onset of the COVID-
crisis we observe that, on top of left-right conflict around levels of state inter-
vention, ideological differences are also increasingly manifest in what con-
cerns the context and capacity for state intervention.
Robustness checks: alternative drivers of attitudinal heterogeneity
In terms of alternative mechanisms, we might suspect that increasing ideo-
logical polarization in perceptions of fiscal constraint, state effectiveness,
welfare state efficiency, or political trust could be grounded not in ideology,
but in egotropic or sociotropic economic grievances, i.e. in differences in how
left- and right-wing citizens evaluate how they and the national economy will
be affected by the COVID-19 crisis. In additional models (included in Table
S.10 in Supplementary Information), we also control for respondents’ percep-
tions of how the pandemic will affect their own and their country’s economic
prospects. Even when additionally controlling for this perception of risk, ideo-
logical placement continues to account for the attitudinal change between
waves on the outcomes just discussed.
Furthermore, since Spain and Sweden are governed by a left-wing
coalition, we might suspect that part of the increasing ideological differen-
tiation could be driven by support for a governing or an opposition party.
The fact that trends towards greater polarization are also present in
Germany, governed by a coalition of the Christian Democrats and the
Social Democrats, already speaks against this alternative explanation. We
perform the same analyses introducing an additional control for whether
the respondent had voted in the last election for a governing or an opposi-
tion party (included in Table S.11 in Supplementary Information). The
results remain robust to this alternative specification.
To inspect the relationship between ideological placement, party support
(government vs. opposition) and attitudinal changes more profoundly, we
zoom in on the German case, where we can find both left- and right-wing
opposition parties. Since the number of observations for some parties is
limited, these results need to be cautiously interpreted and mainly serve as
an exploratory endeavor. Consequently, as we can see in Figure 6 below,
differences in attitudinal change between voters of the different parties are
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relatively small and, in most cases, are not statistically significant from each
other at conventional levels – which is partially due to the large confidence
intervals produced by the low number of observations per party. However,
within parties in the same ideological bloc, we do not observe large differ-
ences in attitudinal change depending on whether the party is in government
or opposition. For example, increases in perceptions of state effectiveness or
political trust are similar among voters of the SPD, the Left, or the Greens,
despite the SPD being in government and the Left and Greens being in oppo-
sition. These findings sustain an interpretation of our findings in terms of pol-
itical- ideological polarization, rather than government/opposition
polarization. However, we do observe signs of a differential pattern displayed
by AfD voters, which separates them from other right-wing voters. Percep-
tions of state capacity and trust are consistently lower among AfD voters
than among supporters of other parties. These voters are less likely to have
improved their perceptions of state effectiveness, of the efficiency of the
welfare state, or their political trust.
Conclusion
Despite the pandemic-induced economic shock, our findings show that citi-
zens’ attitudes towards levels of economic redistribution and welfare
Figure 6. Average differences in attitudes between waves 1 and 2 of the panel for voters
of different parties. Note: Estimates are based on interactive OLS regression models
introducing controls for age, gender, social class, and parent status. Full models are pre-
sented in table S.12 in the Supplementary Information.
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provision have remained remarkably stable, indicating that such attitudes
are deeply-rooted beliefs and sticky. However, we find significant shifts in
public opinion regarding the fiscal context and capacity for state interven-
tion. More importantly, these perceptions about the room for maneuver
and capacity for state intervention have become increasingly ideologically
polarized. In other words, we find attitudinal stability regarding what citi-
zens want to do with the money but ideological polarization concerning
citizens’ contextual assessment of what can be done in general. This
increases overall polarization around the redistributive role of the state.
While left-right discord on desired levels of state intervention continue to
constitute a key feature of political conflict, we now also find increasing
ideological differentiation in assessments of the context and capacity for
the state to intervene. This increasing polarization is likely to affect
welfare politics significantly both in terms of the level of redistribution
and its type: we do know, e.g. that trust and state capacity drive support
for long-term, future-oriented social investment policies (Garritzmann, Nei-
manns, and Busemeyer 2016; Jacobs 2016); we also know that citizens tend
to have more narrow, self-interested social policy preferences under tight
fiscal constraint (Bremer and Bürgisser 2020; Busemeyer and Garritzmann
2017); and finally, we know that many distributive conflicts around the
welfare state can only be solved via compromising and log-rolling, which
tends to require increased tax revenues that are likely to become more
difficult to reap in such a context (e.g. Jacques 2020).
The political implications of COVID-19 will continue to unfold for months if
not several years. For now, however, it seems unlikely that the COVID-19 crisis
will result in a complete reconfiguration of distributive politics. Distributive
conflicts will neither disappear and pacify due to attitudinal convergence
nor strongly intensify due to ideological polarization of how much the
state should intervene. Nonetheless, an increasing ideological polarization
in assessing fiscal constraints, state capacity, and political trust will lead to
even fiercer political battles about fiscal austerity, as well as the types and
levels of social redistribution the state should sustain with its limited
resources.
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